abstract This article investigates a twelfth-century realist view on universals, the individuum-theory. The individuum-theory is criticized by Peter Abelard and Joscelin of Soissons, and endorsed by 'Quoniam de generali' as well as by the unpublished Isagoge commentary found in MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, which is here taken into account for the first time. The individuum-theory blurs traditional distinctions between nominalism and realism by claiming that the universal is the individual thing itself. In this paper, I present the main strategies for such a claim; namely, putting forward identity "by indifference," distinguishing status and attentiones, and neutralizing opposite predicates. I argue that these strategies have parallels in Abelard's own views. The individuum-theory's paradoxical realism seems to defend universal res after criticisms were advanced against more traditional material essence realism, and it seems to have been using some of the nominalists' tools (particularly Abelardian tools) in its endeavor.
much can be said about what the early twelfth-century debate on universals is not. For instance, it is not a discussion of which genera or species grasp the truth of things, or which genera or species a certain individual belongs to, or how one knows that this is so. Twelfth-century magistri thought that the genera and species for which nouns are found in ordinary language, such as 'animal' or 'man,' "cut the world at its joints." They considered it unproblematic both that Socrates belongs to the genus Animal and the species Man and that one knows that he does.
1 Similarly, the debate is not about properties of all sorts, or about things of all sorts. It focuses, rather, on substantial properties to the detriment of accidental ones and on natural things to the detriment of artifacts (these being regarded as mere accidental arrangements of natural things). Scholars have recognized a realist and a nominalist approach to the debate. Realists are addressing an ontological issue. They claim that universality pertains not only to words (voces, sermones, or nomina) , but also to things (res)-in other words, that there are universal things. There is no difficult semantic issue to tackle on this account: universal words simply refer to universal things. Nominalists, by contrast, hold that everything that exists is individual-no universal thing exists. The issue to tackle is not ontological but semantic. Some of our words, such as proper names, refer to individual things and thus, obviously, are meaningful (that is, able to signify something). But other words are universal, and they too are meaningful. How can universal words signify, given that there is no universal thing to which they refer? Both the metaphysical and the semantic perspectives are a form of exegesis. They originate from authoritative texts studied as part of the school curriculum (Porphyry's Isagoge, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, as well as Boethius's commentaries on them). 2 Authoritative texts transmitted both an ontological way of dealing with genera and species, and a predicative one. According to the ontological approach, a universal is a common nature that is "in many individuals." According to the logical or predicative approach, a universal is that which is "predicated of many things." 3 Now that the major lines have been established, we shall analyze a theory of this debate that somehow blurs most of them, the individuum-theory. 4 Despite being a realist view, its core idea is the nominalist claim that "everything that exists is individual."
5 On my interpretation, the individuum-theory is a mitigated form of realism that developed in the time of Peter Abelard following criticism of material essence realism. This, in turn, is a traditional form of realism claiming that universal common things exist as constituents of individual things. The individuum-theory rejects universal common things endorsed by material essence realism, claiming that, on the contrary, all that exists are individual things. At the same time, it still holds that universals are things. Given that only individual things exist, the individuum-theory therefore claims that "the universal is the singular thing itself."
6 Research on this view is scanty. Analysis by Martin Tweedale and Peter King has focused primarily on Abelard's criticism of the view rather than on positive accounts. See Jorge J. E. Gracia, "Approaches," and, for details of the twelfth-century curriculum, Marenbon, "Synthesis, . 3 See Christophe Erismann, "Penser le commun." The contrast esse in multis vs. dici de multis might not have been regarded as unproblematically overlapping with the contrast res vs. voces in this period-even Abelard accepts that, in principle, authorities might be talking about predicating things, and indeed the ancient sources do sometimes talk of predication in a way that is not simply linguistic. i n d i v i d u a l s a s u n i v e r s a l s Roberto Pinzani both focus on one published tract ('Quoniam de generali') and only address particular aspects of the theory.
8 Specifically, scholars have failed to take into account the Isagoge commentary of MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3237, which seemingly endorses the individuum-theory. My aim here is to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the individuum-theory on the basis of both published and manuscript sources. Moreover, I argue that parallels can be found between the strategies of the individuum-theory and of Abelard, a point which has not been adequately highlighted so far. Accordingly, I contend that a form of realism was developed in the twelfth century that tried to accommodate both realist and nominalist intuitions, and defended realism using Abelardian tools.
The article is divided into three sections. First, I summarize the basic tenets of material essence realism. Second, I present the sources and main claims of the individuum-theory. Finally, I investigate the strategies used by the individuum-theory and draw parallels with Abelard's views.
. c r i t i c i z i n g m a t e r i a l e s s e n c e r e a l i s m
Realism enjoyed a venerable tradition, stretching back to Eriugena, Anselm of Canterbury, and Odo of Cambrai, before it was endorsed by William of Champeaux in the early twelfth century.
9 William's realism is usually called 'material essence realism.'
10 Material essence realism is a theory that tries to explain both what is common to different individuals and what is peculiar to each of them, therefore taking neither as primitive.
11 Two constituents are identified within a singular,
8
See Wojciech Wciórka, "Is Socrates a Universal?," focusing on the strategy for neutralizing opposite predicates, and Roberto Pinzani, "Identità parziale," on identity according to the individuum-theory. 9 See especially Erismann, L'Homme commun. 10 LI 10.17-11.9 (Abelard's description of material essence realism): "Quidam enim ita rem uniuersalem accipiunt, ut in rebus diuersis ab inuicem per formas eandem essentialiter substantiam collocent, quae singularium, in quibus est, materialis sit essentia et, in se ipsa una, tantum per formas inferiorum sit diuersa. Quas quidem formas si separari contingeret, nulla penitus differentia rerum esset, quae formarum tantum diuersitate ab inuicem distant, cum sit penitus eadem essentialiter materia. Verbi gratia in singulis hominibus numero differentibus eadem est hominis substantia, quae hic Plato per haec accidentia fit, ibi Socrates per illa. Quibus quidem Porphyrius assentire maxime uidetur, cum ait: 'Participatione speciei plures homines unus, in particularibus autem unus et communis plures.' Et rursus: 'Indiuidua, inquit, dicuntur huiusmodi, quoniam unumquodque eorum consistit ex proprietatibus, quarum collectio non est in alio.' Similiter et in singulis animalibus specie differentibus unam et eandem essentialiter animalis substantiam ponunt, quam per diuersarum differentiarum susceptionem in diuersas species trahunt, ueluti si ex hac cera modo statuam hominis, modo bouis faciam diuersas eidem penitus essentiae manenti formas aptando. Hoc tamen refert quod eodem tempore cera eadem statuas non constituit, sicut in uniuersali conceditur, quod scilicet uniuersale ita commune Boethius dicit, ut eodem tempore idem totum sit in diuersis quorum substantiam materialiter constituat, et cum in se sit uniuersale, idem per aduenientes formas singulare sit, sine quibus naturaliter in se subsistit et absque eis nullatenus actualiter permanet, uniuersale quidem in natura, singulare uero actu et incorporeum quidem et insensibile in simplicitate uniuersalitatis suae intelligitur, corporeum uero atque sensibile idem per accidentia in actu subsistit et eadem teste Boethio et subsistunt singularia et intelliguntur uniuersalia. ; LNPS 515.14-31 (quoted below, n. 44); HC §6 (quoted below, n. 55); GS §33; QG § §2-3; P17, 123va, 125va (quoted below, n. 46) ; Erismann, "Generalis essentia, [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] Julie Brumberg, "Universaux, and Caterina Tarlazzi, "Iam corpus, [3] [4] [5] [6] . The label 'material essence realism,' based on LI 10.19, is introduced by Tweedale, Abailard on Universals.
individual thing, for example, Socrates. One is the universal constituent, the species of that individual thing (Man); the other is an individual constituent, proper to that individual thing only, that is, the accidents of that individual thing (such as Socrates's particular color).
12 The species, in turn, can be analyzed in terms of two constituents. Just as Socrates shares Man with all other individual men, so Man has a universal constituent, which it shares with all other species of the same sort, and this is its genus, Animal. It also has a constituent that is proper to that species only: the particular differences by which it is distinct from all other species of the genus Animal (rationality and mortality). The genus Animal, in turn, is a species of a higher genus, Corporeal Substance, where the same reasoning can be applied, identifying a general constituent and Animal's own differences. In a nutshell, the universal is a constituent of whatever falls beneath it, be they its inferior species or inferior individuals. Material essence realism highlights this by saying that the universal is the 'matter' of its inferiors, to which 'forms' (i.e. differences or accidents) are added to produce the inferior species or individuals.
13
The universal constituent, it is claimed, is an entity, a thing that exists in the world. Of course, it does not exist in the way in which individual things exist. But it, too, exists, with the following special ontological characteristics. A universal is a common entity existing: (1) entirely 14 and (2) simultaneously in each inferior thing it is in; and (3) in such a way as to constitute the substance of the inferior thing. Three comparisons found in Boethius are usually mentioned in order to make this point:
15 (1) The universal is not common to a and b as a field is common to a and b when a owns one part of it and b another-the universal is entirely in each inferior thing. (2) It is not common as a horse is common to a and b because a first owned it entirely and subsequently b owned it entirely-a universal is common simultaneously to its inferiors. (3) Finally, it is not common in the way in which a theatre show is common to all who see it, that is, entirely and at the same time but without constituting the substance of the things to which it is common-the universal is a metaphysical constituent of its inferiors.
Consequently, there is an interdependence between universal and individual entities according to material essence realism.
16 As is clear from what has been
12
See Gracia, Introduction, [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] . Considering accidents as the principle of individuation of the substance possessing them is one of the tenets of the "Standard Theory of Individuality" of the high Middle Ages (125-29).
13
It is doubtful whether an individual has one material component only (the last species) on this account, or one material component for each species and each genus located above that individual in Porphyry's tree. The twelfth-century way of considering universal things as matter, moreover, is quite idiosyncratic (but cf. for sources Porphyrius, isag., Boethius, Div., . Matter is that which is common to different individuals of the same species, or to different species of the same genus. i n d i v i d u a l s a s u n i v e r s a l s said in relation to constituents, this view is a form of immanent realism: universals do not exist apart from inferior things but as their metaphysical constituents. A universal cannot exist without being instantiated in at least one individual. However, individual things also depend on the existence of universals for their own existence. The universal common entity provides the nature of its individualsin other words, it supplies them with all they need in order to be what they are, whereas the individual contribution to existence lies only in accidental features. Indeed, the interdependence seems to be in favor of the universal: a universal must be instantiated by at least one individual but the non-existence of any individual (provided that at least one exists) does not entail the non-existence of the universal; on the other hand, the non-existence of the universal always entails the non-existence of the individual.
17
In the first decades of the twelfth century, arguments were raised against various aspects of material essence realism-for instance, against its use of accidents as the principle of individuation.
18 Arguments were also directed against the special ontological characteristics of universals, and the most frequent are variations of two arguments. The first is that, on material essence realism, the universal thing will have to be the subject of contrary properties at the same time-for instance, the universal thing will be the subject of the opposed differences by which it produces different species, such as being rational and being irrational, or of the opposed accidents that different individuals happen to have, such as being ill, which is proper to this individual, and being in good health, which is proper to that one.
19
The second is that, according to material essence realism, one and the same thing (the universal common thing) will have to be entirely and at the same time in two spatially distinct places where it is instantiated.
20 It is characteristic of the medieval debate that universal entities are rejected not simply for being an uneconomical option on the balance sheet (albeit with the possibility that such entities could exist). As these arguments demonstrate, universals according to material essence realism were considered to be ontologically impossible, something that simply cannot exist in the world.
2 . t h e i n d i v i d v v m -t h e o r y
Criticism of material essence realism is the starting-point for the individuum-theory. Before considering its basic tenets, however, we should present the sources for reconstructing this theory. The individuum-theory is described, critically, by three texts that probably date back to the 1120s: Abelard's Logica 'Ingredientibus,' 22 and two anonymous works, the Abelardian Logica 'Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum' 17 See Erismann, "Immanent Realism, and "Penser le commun, " 385. 18 See LI 13.5-17; Gracia, Introduction, and Brumberg, "Substrat." 19 See GS §34; and QG § §9-10, 14.
21
I am grateful to John Marenbon for pointing this out to me. Abelard, for instance, says that universal entities are repugnant to the physica in LI 11.10-11.
22
LI 13. 18-14.6, 14.18-31, 15.23-16.18 , are the crucial passages (see also Claude Lafleur and Joanne Carrier, "Édition," for a revised edition). Abelard also goes back to criticizing the individuumtheory in LI 37. 27 'Quoniam de generali' and P17 provide the most detailed account of the individuum-theory, but all these sources are quite consistent in presenting the view, its terminology, and strategies for supporting its claims.
Given that it rejects material essence realism, the individuum-theory has an ontology to which a nominalist could subscribe.
28 Things, it claims, are distinct from one another not only in their forms (as in material essence realism) but also in their material essences. Things are therefore entirely distinct from one another. 
24
GS § §50-73 (description and criticism of the individuum-theory), and § §87-89 (the treatise's own position).
25
QG, and Francesco Romano, Una soluzione, for another edition.
26
P17 in MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3237, 123ra-124va (first, incomplete version of the commentary) and 125ra-130rb (second, complete version). P17 has an ambiguous position with regard to the individuum-theory. On the one hand, it introduces the theory as the view "of other people" (presumably, therefore, not the author himself: see below, n. 30). On the other hand, it goes on to put forward counter-objections against each objection to the individuum-theory.
27
Ioannes Saresberiensis, Met., and Pol., . For comments on John's lists, see Yukio Iwakuma, "Influence," 313-14; Antonio Tursi, "Nueve tesis"; and Pinzani, "Giovanni di Salisbury."
28
Compare LI 13.18-33 (quoted below, n. 29), and LI 64.20-65.11. 29 LI 13.18-33: "Vnde alii aliter de uniuersalitate sentientes magisque ad sententiam rei accedentes dicunt res singulas non solum formis ab inuicem esse diuersas, uerum personaliter in suis essentiis esse discretas nec ullo modo id quod in una est, esse in alia, siue illud materia sit siue forma, nec eas formis quoque remotis minus in essentiis suis discretas posse subsistere, quia earum discretio personalis, secundum quam scilicet haec non est illa, non per formas fit, sed est per ipsam essentiae diuersitatem, sicut et formae ipsae in se ipsis diuersae sunt inuicem, alioquin formarum diuersitas in infinitatem procederet, ut alias ad aliarum diuersitatem necesse esset supponi. Talem differentiam Porphyrius notauit inter generalissimum et specialissimum dicens: 'Amplius neque species fieret unquam generalissimum neque genus specialissimum,' ac si diceret: haec est earum differentia quod huius non est illius essentia. Sic et praedicamentorum discretio consistit non per formas aliquas, quae eam faciant, sed per propriae diuersificationem essentiae." LNPS 518.21-24: "Dicunt enim singulas substantias ita in propriae suae essentiae discretione diuersas esse, ut nullo modo haec substantia sit eadem cum illa, etiamsi substantiae materia penitus formis careret." See Gracia, Introduction, QG §26: "Est autem primum propositum sententiae nostrae: Quicquid est, <est> indiuiduum; quod ex ipso rerum effectu omnibus rei ueritatem intuentibus manifeste iudicatur." P17, BnF, lat. 3237, 123vb, 125va: "Nunc ad sententiam aliorum accedamus, qui similiter ut praedicti genera et species in utrisque, id est in rebus et in uocibus, constituunt. Quorum sententiae positio est nullum uniuersale materiam esse diuersorum; sed sicut unum indiuiduum nequit esse aliud, ita materiae eorum idem esse nequeunt. Itaque materiae et species et genera diuersorum sic essentialiter inter se discretae sunt sicut indiuidua, ut uerum sit dicere tot genera tot species esse in numero quot sunt indiuidua. Nec i n d i v i d u a l s a s u n i v e r s a l s omnino est praeter individuum]." 31 However, it also wants to claim that (ii) universals are things, in accordance with realism. Given that, by (i), the only things that exist are individuals, it follows that (iii) universals are precisely those things that are individual.
32 Socrates, they say, is Socrates, but also Man, Animal, Body, and Substance. He is therefore an individual, a species, a genus, and the most general genus.
33 The same is true for any other individual. Consequently, the same thing is particular and universal.
34
It is, as Wojciech Wciórka put it, an "audacious" theory.
35 If the authoritative texts are clear about anything, it is that universality and singularity are opposed and must be attributed to distinct items. In chapter 7 of De Interpretatione, Aristotle defines a universal as that which is apt to be predicated of many, and an individual aliquod uniuersale commune uel praedicabile de pluribus est ita quod essentialiter pluribus insit. Sed commune appellatur idcirco quod, cum ipsum uniuersale in uno sit indiuiduo, aliud ei simillimum in materia et forma est in alio, ut uox dicitur communis non quod eadem uox essentialiter ueniat ad diuersos, sed consimilis. Praedicabile autem de pluribus dicitur, non ideo quod conueniat essentialiter pluribus, sed quia ipsum est materia unius et suum indifferens uel est uel esse potest materia alterius. Nec ideo eadem species diuersorum esse dicitur quod essentialiter sit eadem, sed quia sunt consimiles. Illas autem species diuersorum similes et indifferentes esse dico, quae cum discretae sint, tamen ex materiis et formis consimiles effectus exigentibus componuntur, ut homo Socratis et homo Platonis, cum essentialiter differant, tamen materiae et formae eorum consimiles effectus operantur. Itaque Socrates in ea natura in qua subiectus est sensibus, scilicet secundum illam naturam quam significat de eo 'Socrates,' indiuiduum est, ideo quia tale est proprietas eius numquam tota reperitur in alio. Est enim alter homo sed Socratitatem nullus habet praeter Socratem. De eodem Socrate quandoque habetur intellectus non concipiens quicquid notat haec uox 'Socrates,' sed Socratitatis oblitus id tantum perspicit de Socrate quod notat inde 'homo,' idest animal rationale mortale, et secundum hanc attentionem species est, est enim praedicabilis de pluribus in quid de eodem statu. Si intellectus postponat rationalitatem et mortalitatem et id tantum sibi subiciat quod notat haec uox 'animal,' in hoc statu genus est. Quod si relictis omnibus formis in hoc tantum consideremus Socratem quod notat inde 'substantia,' generalissimum est. Idem de Platone dicas per omnia. Quod si quis dicat proprietatem Socratis in eo quod est homo non magis esse in pluribus quam eiusdem Socratis in quantum est Socrates, aeque enim homo qui est Socratis in nullo alio est nisi in Socrate, sicut ipse Socrates, uerum quidem concedunt, ita tamen determinandum putant: Socrates in quantum est Socrates nullum prorsus indifferens habet quod in alio inueniatur sed in quantum est homo plura habet indifferentia quae in Platone et aliis inueniuntur. Nam et Plato similiter homo est ut Socrates, quamuis non sit idem homo essentialiter qui est Socrates. Idem de animali et substantia." 
LNPS 518.9-10 (quoted below, n. 51). 35 Wciórka, "Is Socrates a Universal?," 57.
as that which is not.
36 In the Isagoge, Porphyry states that, among items that are predicated, some (individuals) are said of one only whereas others (genera, species, differences, propria, and common accidents) are said of many.
37 Indeed, some inspiration for the individuum-theory could have been found in a passage of Boethius's commentary that scholars call the 'unique-subject theory.' In this passage, Boethius says that the subject of singularity and universality is one and the same, just as the same line is concave and convex from different points of view.
38
However, Boethius's overall aim is to say that, although things exist as singular in the world, they can be thought of as universal through abstraction. He certainly did not mean that the singular thing also exists as a universal.
39 Aristotelian immanentism could also have provided some sort of antecedent because of its claim that universals are always instantiated.
40 This means that only individuals exist in act. A universal exists even if it is instantiated by just one individual (as is true for the phoenix). However, although universals always exist in individuals or even in just one individual, they are certainly not the individuals themselves on this account.
One might wonder, therefore, why a view claiming that the individual thing is a universal was defended. It certainly was an aspect of the twelfth-century debate that it tried to defend, as cleverly and ingeniously as possible, difficult and counterintuitive positions. The individuum-theory, however, has more to recommend itself and does not lack philosophical interest. It is an attempt at defending realism (and thus honor the thought that universal predications are true in virtue of something extramental) 41 without being committed to universal common things existing at the same time in different individuals. The individuumtheory is also relevant from a historical point of view, documenting a form of realism much more palatable to nominalists than material essence realism. Closeness to nominalism is evident in the individuum-theory's accepting criticism of material essence realism and in claiming that only individuals exist. As the next section will make clear, this view also uses strategies and terminology reminiscent of Abelard's for a purpose (defending realism) that is the opposite of Abelard's own purpose.
36
Aristoteles, De Int., 7, 17a39-b2: "dico autem uniuersale quod in pluribus natum est praedicari, singulare uero quod non, ut homo quidem uniuersale, Plato uero eorum quae sunt singularia." For our purposes, the distinction between what is actually predicated of many and what can be predicated of many may be disregarded; see, however, Riin Sirkel, "Alexander of Aphrodisias," 298-300. 37 Porphyrius, isag., 2, 17-20: "Eorum enim quae praedicantur alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut indiuidua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc, alia uero de pluribus, quemadmodum genera et species et differentiae et propria, et accidentia communiter sed non proprie alicui."
38
Boethius, II Comm. In Isag., I.11 (166.23-167.7): "neque enim interclusum est ut duae res eodem in subiecto sint ratione diuersae, ut linea curua atque caua, quae res cum diuersis definitionibus terminentur diuersusque earum intellectus sit, semper tamen in eodem subiecto reperiuntur; eadem enim linea caua, eadem curua est. ita quoque generibus et speciebus, idest singularitati et uniuersalitati, unum quidem subiectum est, sed alio modo uniuersale est, cum cogitatur, alio singulare, cum sentitur in rebus his in quibus esse suum habet." On the unique-subject theory, see Alain de Libera, L'Art, 235-44.
39
P17 explicitly mentions Boethius's unique-subject theory to support the individuum-theory: see n. 30. Boethius's passage also supports material essence realism in LI: see n. 10.
40
As defined by Erismann, Aristotelian immanentism is the view defending 'immanent universals which exist in the individual, in re' (Erismann, "Immanent Realism, " 212) and it relies on Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories. See Erismann, L'Homme commun, "Immanent Realism, " and "Un autre aristotélisme?"
41
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for putting things in this manner. i n d i v i d u a l s a s u n i v e r s a l s
. s t r a t e g i e s f o r t h e i n d i v i d v v m -t h e o r y
Three main strategies are used by the individuum-theory for supporting its claims: introducing a new sort of identity, identity by indifference; identifying different states (status) of the individual thing, each corresponding to a certain attentio on the observer's part; and, finally, neutralizing opposing predicates. My contention is that all these strategies have parallels in Abelard's own works. 
Identity by Indifference
According to material essence realism, individuals of the same species and species of the same genus share a common entity, which is essentially the same in each individual or species. We should therefore draw a distinction between two sorts of identity according to material essence realism. 43 The first (and stronger) sort of identity is the identity of the species, or the genus, in its inferiors. An example is the identity of the species Man in all individual men-where the species Man is understood as one and the same thing existing entirely and at the same time in each individual man, and the matter of each individual man. The second (and weaker) sort of identity is the identity of individuals of the same species, or of species of the same genus, among themselves. An example is the identity of individual men among themselves, qua human beings. Men are the same among themselves (according to the weaker sense of 'the same') because one and the same species (according to the stronger sense of 'the same') is in each of them as their matter. In the description of material essence realism in LNPS, the distinction is captured by a nuance in terminology. Things that are identical according to the first kind of identity are "essentially the same" (idem essentialiter)-indeed they are not many things, but just one. Things that are identical according to the second kind of identity are "the same in essence" (idem in essentia). 44 Essentially the same thing is found in each individual of the same species-such a thing is, precisely, the species. Essentially the same thing is found in each species of the same genus-such a thing is, precisely, the genus. Consequently, individuals of the same species are the same in essence (or, following the text more closely, are "not different" in essence) because they have one and the same matter, the species. Similarly, species of the 42 By this I mean that similarities can be detected between Abelard's views and the individuumtheory with regard to terminology and strategies; that is to say, that certain elements are present in both positions. This might or might not be the result of borrowing such elements from Abelard and the relationship may vary with respect to different elements. In general, however, my interpretation favors the hypothesis of a realist borrowing of at least some elements from Abelard.
43
I am here using "sameness" and "identity" interchangeably.
44
LNPS 515.14-31, emphasis added: "Nonnulli enim ponunt decem res diuersas esse naturaliter secundum decem praedicamentorum uel generalissimorum distinctionem, cum uidelicet ita dicant res esse uniuersales, hoc est naturaliter communicabiles pluribus, quod eandem rem essentialiter in pluribus ita ponunt ut eadem quae est in hac re, essentialiter sit in illa, diuersis tamen formis affecta. Verbi gratia ut animal, natura scilicet substantia animata sensibilis, ita est in Socrate et Brunello et in aliis, quod eadem quae est in Socrate et per aduenientes formas effecta est Socrates, et essentialiter tota est in Brunello ita quod Socrates nullo modo a Brunello in essentia diuersus est sed in formis, cum eadem essentia penitus materialiter aliis formis in isto, aliis formis in illo sit occupata. Quibus illud Porphyrii consentire uidetur, scilicet: 'Participatione speciei plures homines unus, unus autem et communis plures.' Et iuxta hanc sententiam praedicari de pluribus tale est, ac si diceremus: idem essentialiter ita inesse aliquibus rebus, per formas oppositas diuersificatis, ut singulis essentialiter uel adiacenter conueniat." same genus are the same in essence because essentially the same thing (the genus) is in each of them. On the one hand, a and b are essentially the same when they are, in fact, the very same thing. (Here essentialiter seems to rely on the meaning of essentia as 'existing thing,' well-attested in the twelfth century.) On the other hand, a and b are the same in essence when they share the same essentia, which in turn is taken as a universal common thing, identical with neither a nor b. (In this case, in essentia seems to rely on the meaning of essentia as 'matter.'
45

)
In other texts, however, such terminology is not followed. In the description of material essence realism in P17, "the same in essentia" is used to refer to things that are identical according to the first kind of identity.
46 Abelard also discusses identity 'in essentia,' and again his meaning seems close to the first sort of identity for material essence realism. According to Abelard, two items a and b are "the same in essence" when they are, in fact, the very same thing. Tullius and Cicero, for instance, are the same in essence. This ensis and this mucro are also the same in essence (ensis and mucro are two Latin words meaning 'sword,' and they are additionally taken here to refer to one and the same sword). This white item and this hard item are also the same in essence under the assumption that 'white' and 'hard' refer to one and the same thing here.
47 In other words, according to Abelard a and b are the same in essence when they are not two things but rather one. Stated differently, a and b are the same in essence when they have all their parts in common.
48
As has been said, Abelard's identity in essentia corresponds to the first sort of identity for material essence realism. At first sight, it seems not to correspond to the second kind of identity for material essence realism (that is, the identity existing among individuals of the same species, and among species of the same genus-such as the identity of men among themselves, qua human beings). After all, individuals differ through their forms, and species differ through their differences; they can hardly be said to be exactly the same thing, according to the first sort of identity. Considered from another perspective, however, the issue appears more complicated. One should keep in mind that, for material essence realism, the species is all that is substantial to an individual, that is to say, all 45 See Jean Jolivet, "Lexicographie," 538-43, on essentia meaning, on the one hand, 'thing,' 'existing thing,' and 'substance' and, on the other, 'matter' and "fond de l'être," as opposed to form.
46 P17, 123va, 125va, emphasis added: "Quorundam enim eorum est sententia eandem rem uniuersalem totam indiuisam in diuersis et oppositis indiuiduis esse, ut uere dici possit idem animal in essentia est materia Socratis et Brunelli. Ponunt etiam genus et quodlibet uniuersale in simplici natura acceptum rei singulari oppositum esse, inferioribus uero formis uestitum idem esse cum singulari."
47
Ensis and mucro in the abovementioned example are the same in essence and the same in definition. This white item and this hard item are the same in essence but not in definition. , and below, n. 53.
48
See Marenbon, Abelard in Four Dimensions, 195 . If it is characterised in this way, sameness in essence can be differentiated from sameness in number. According to Abelard, a part of a thing is the same in number as the thing it belongs to, but not the same in essence; see TSB . In later accounts, Abelard says that the part is neither the same in number as its whole nor different in number from it: see TChr III. 148-53 (250.1807-252.1874 ). Therefore, things that are the same in number are not always also the same in essence. On the other hand, things that are the same in essence are always the same in number. However, they can differ in definition (see above, n. 47) and in property (see below
what it is. Accidents alone are added to the species to produce individuals. And there is also evidence, at least in some accounts, that material essence realism tends to consider differences as accidents.
49 Seen from this perspective, when individuals of the same species, or species of the same genus, are said to be "the same in essence," the first and stronger meaning of identity (which is captured in the way in which P17 and Abelard refer to "the same in essence") can also be seen lurking in the background.
50
The individuum-theory similarly maintains that individuals of the same species (and species of the same genus) are 'the same.' However, it needs a different meaning of 'the same' than the problematic one of material essence realism. So, the individuum-theory says that they are the same not essentially, but indifferently (non essentialiter, sed indifferenter). Individuals of the same species (and species of the same genus) are the same because they do not differ in, or, in positive terms, are similar in being a certain something.
51 Identity by indifference attempts to provide unity while maintaining distinction. As noted above, individual things are distinct from one another in both matter and forms according to the individuum-theory. Consequently, there is a sense in which there are as many species as individuals, since each individual is a species and is essentially distinct from any other individual. However, all individuals of a certain species are the same indifferently. Inasmuch as they are the same indifferently, they should be counted as one.
49
See especially QG § §2-3, and Brumberg, "Universaux," 429-39.
50
As acknowledged in criticism against material essence realism noting that, following this view, only ten things exist, one per category. See especially LI 12.27-41.
51
LI 13.33-14.6, emphasis added: "Cum autem omnes res ita diuersas ab inuicem esse uelint, ut nulla earum cum alia uel eandem essentialiter materiam uel eandem essentialiter formam participet, uniuersale tamen rerum adhuc retinentes idem non essentialiter quidem, sed indifferenter ea quae discreta sunt, appellant, ueluti singulos homines in se ipsis discretos idem esse in homine dicunt, id est non differre in natura humanitatis, et eosdem quos singulares dicunt secundum discretionem, uniuersalem dicunt secundum indifferentiam et similitudinis conuenientiam." LNPS 518.9-13, emphasis added: "Sunt alii in rebus uniuersalitatem assignantes, qui eandem rem uniuersalem et particularem esse astruunt. Hi namque eandem rem in diuersis indifferenter, non essentialiter inferioribus affirmant. Veluti cum dicunt idem esse in Socrate et Platone, 'idem' pro indifferenti, idest consimili, intelligunt." QG §30, emphasis added: "Et attende quod Socrates et unumquodque indiuiduum hominis, in eo quod unumquodque est animal rationale mortale, sunt unum et idem; non dico idem essentialiter, quia et secundum hunc statum et secundum quemlibet adeo opposita sunt in esse suo quod nullum eorum est aliquid aliorum nec etiam esse potest; sed sunt idem, idest indifferentes, secundum statum hominis. Ecce Socrates: secundum statum hominis est species specialissima, quia secundum hunc statum cum indiuiduo hominis tantum conuenit. Item, ipse Socrates secundum statum animalis est genus et species, quippe animal est genus hominis et species corporis. Item, Socrates secundum statum substantiae est genus generalissimum."
52
GS § §51-53, emphasis added: "Huic sententiae aeque auctoritas et ratio contradicunt. Et primum quibus auctoritatibus contraria sit uideamus. Porphyrius dicit: 'Decem quidem generalissima, specialissima in numero quodam non tamen indefinito, indiuidua uero infinita sunt.' Positio uero huius sententiae hoc habet: Singula indiuidua substantiae in quantum sunt substantia generalissima esse. Itaque non potius indiuidua infinita sunt quam generalissima. Soluunt tamen illi dicentes: Generalissima quidem infinita esse essentialiter sed per indifferentiam decem tantum, quot enim indiuidua substantiae tot etiam sunt generalissimae substantiae. Omnia tamen illa generalissima generalissimum unum dicuntur quia indifferentia sunt. Socrates enim in eo quod est substantia indifferens est cum qualibet substantia in eo statu quod substantia est." LI 14.22-27: "Qui tot species quot indiuidua quantum ad rerum numerum ponunt et totidem genera, quantum uero ad similitudinem naturarum pauciorem numerum uniuersalium quam singularium assignant. Quippe omnes homines et in se multi sunt per personalem discretionem et unum per humanitatis similitudinem et iidem a se ipsis diuersi quantum ad Lists of various meanings of 'the same' (and corresponding meanings of 'different') are found in several twelfth-century texts from Abelard's school. The Abelardian Logica 'Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum' and Glossae secundum vocales and Abelard's own Theologia 'Summi Boni,' Theologia Christiana and Theologia 'Scholarium' all include such lists, and two meanings of identity are also mentioned in the Sententiae secundum magistrum Petrum of Abelard's school.
53 These lists all mention "the same by likeness."
54 Still, the meaning of identity by indifference might have originated in the realist camp. Abelard's Historia Calamitatum tells us that, as a result of Abelard's criticisms, William of Champeaux abandoned material essence realism and adopted a new meaning of 'the same'-the same by indifference.
55 A sentence attributed to William also puts forward the distinction between being the same according to the identity of the same essence (secundum identitatem eiusdem prorsus essentiae) and being the same according to indifference (secundum indifferentiam). 56 discretionem et ad similitudinem iudicantur." P17, 123vb, 125va-b: "Praedictae sententiae opponitur sic. Dicit Aristoteles decem esse generalissima, indiuidua uero infinita esse; sed cum superius positum sit tot esse genera quot sunt indiuidua, tunc necesse erit similiter esse generalissima infinita. Solutio. Non dixit Aristoteles omnia generalissima esse decem tantum in essentia, sed manerias eorum, id est collectiones, decem appellauit. Vel omnia generalissima substantiae secundum similitudinem et uisum hominum unum esse reputauit, sicut plura nomina multiuoca pro eadem significatione solent unum appellari. Vel sic intellexit: decem sunt, id est apta sunt in suprema natura decem scilicet intellectibus concipi, cum indiuidua discrete concipi nequeant nisi innumeris intellectibus. Vel illud de uocibus generalissimis dictum fuit." As we have seen above (n. 13) it is customary to say that the species is the matter of the individual. Thus, the individuum-theory claims that the individual Plato, inasmuch as he is the species Man, is the matter of himself essentially, and of each other individual man indifferently: see QG § §31, 37; P17, 124ra-b, 126ra.
53
LNPS 558.11-560.15, GSV 178-79, and TSB II. 82-102 (142.745-150.959 ) mention the same six meanings of 'the same' (and corresponding meanings of 'different'): the same in essence, in number, by definition, by likeness, unchanging, and by effect. In TChr III. 138-62 (247.1677-255.1975 ), the same in property is added, and the list now amounts to five: the same in essence or in number, in property, by definition, by likeness, and unchanging. Finally, in TSch II.95-100 (454.1411-456.1487) three meanings of 'the same' are mentioned (by likeness, in essence or number, and by definition or property) and three of 'different' (in essence, in number, by definition or property). SP 115-17 distinguishes between identitas personae (additionally said to be personaliter et quasi discrete) and identitas naturae (indifferenter ac simpliciter); see Jolivet, "Trois variations," 138-39. Boethius also distinguishes three meanings of 'the same'-numerically the same, the same in species, and the same in genus: II Comm. In Isag., 
Status and Attentio
The individuum-theory claims that, in his forms and matter, Socrates is different from everything else in the world; he is the same essentially as nothing but himself. He is, however, the same indifferently as other things in being a certain something. For example, he is the same indifferently as every other man in that he is a man and the same indifferently as every other animal in that he is an animal. Insofar as an individual is a certain x (with 'x' referring either to that very individual or to the species or genus to which that individual belongs), that individual is said to be in the status of x.
57 Socrates, for instance, can be said to be in the status of Socrates, of Man, of Animal, of Body etc. Any individual thus has multiple status, 58 one for being that individual and one for every species and genus above that individual in Porphyry's tree.
59
Every status of a given thing corresponds to an attentio of the subject who knows this thing. An attentio is an act of the intellect, by which the thing is considered. According to the individuum-theory, an act of attentio does not belie the way things are;
60 it may, however, consider only certain aspects of the thing and neglect others. If someone considers (attendat) Socrates in the status of Socrates (i.e. inasmuch as he is Socrates) he or she will find him different from all other things in the world. Giraud and Constant Mews, "Liber" and Giraud, Per verba magistri, [193] [194] [195] [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] [208] [209] [210] [211] On status in the individuum-theory see LNPS 518.13-27: "Et cum dicunt idem de pluribus praedicari uel inesse aliquibus, tale est, ac si aperte diceretur: quaedam in aliqua conuenire natura, idest similia esse ut in eo quod corpora sunt uel animalia. Et iuxta hanc, ut diximus, sententiam eandem rem uniuersalem et particularem esse concedunt, diuersis tamen respectibus; uniuersalem quidem in eo quod cum pluribus communitatem habet, particularem secundum hoc quod a ceteris rebus diuersa est. Dicunt enim singulas substantias ita in propriae suae essentiae discretione diuersas esse, ut nullo modo haec substantia sit eadem cum illa, etiamsi substantiae materiae penitus formis careret, quod tale secundum illos praedicari de pluribus, ac si dicatur: aliquis status est, participatione cuius multae sunt conuenientes, praedicari de uno solo, ac si dicatur, aliquis status est, participatione cuius multae sunt non conuenientes." P17, BnF, lat. 3237, 123vb, 125va quoted above, n. 30, especially: "Status autem appello uel res ex materia et formis constitutas uel passiones, id est constitutiones quae in rebus sunt constitutis, uel partes quae ipsas res constituunt." See also Wciórka, "Is Socrates a Universal?," 63-68.
58
It may be helpful to note that, in the nominative case, status is both the singular and the plural form of this Latin term.
59
Consequently, any status seems to be the extramental and extralinguistic correlate of a proper or common noun or of a verb phrase made up of the verb 'to be' followed by a proper or common noun. Because of that, status do not correspond to contemporary "states of affairs" meant as objective counterparts of propositional attitudes. A "state of affairs" would rather correspond to Abelard's dictum, that is, what is said by a proposition. See Laurent Cesalli, "States of Affairs"; and Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, 282-304.
60
It seems, therefore, that acts of attention are only veridical according to QG. See below, for a much wider range of acts of attentio according to Abelard. name 'Socrates,' which marks him out as different from anything else. To consider Socrates in the status of Socrates means to take into account all of Socrates's properties (i.e. his socratitas or 'socrateity'). Another attentio, however, might consider Socrates only insofar as he has certain properties-for instance, insofar as he is a rational mortal animal. Such attentio neglects properties that Socrates possesses as an individual but nonetheless still considers him in a status he truly possesses. In the status of man, Socrates is a species and the same (indifferently) with all other individual men, but still essentially different from every other thing. 'Quoniam de generali' insists that nobody's attentio can change the way things are.
61
Moreover, Socrates in statu Socratis is an individual; in statu hominis, a species; and in statu animalis, a genus. It does not follow that the thing is, in itself, some kind of neutral entity, indifferent to singularity or universality. The status in which the thing is individual should be regarded as primary because the thing is considered with all its properties in that status.
Status and attentio are key notions in Abelard's discussion of universals and of acts of understanding in the Logica 'Ingredientibus' and De intellectibus. The purpose that they fulfill for Abelard, however, is quite different from their purpose in the individuum-theory. When referring to status, Abelard's purpose is to explain the nominatio of universal words, that is, approximately, their reference. Universal words (e.g. 'man') and proper nouns (e.g. 'Socrates') both name individual things (e.g. Socrates). Proper nouns name individual things insofar as they are distinct from all other things. Universal words, in contrast, name singular things insofar as they agree (with one another) in a certain status, for instance, the status hominis, being a man. Abelard insists that such a status, in which things agree and which is the cause of the imposition of universal names to singular things, is not itself a thing.
62
Questions have been raised about the Abelardian status, particularly on the matter of their relationship to dicta and divine ideas.
63 Even if they are not things, status 61 See QG § §27, 29: "Quod qualiter sit, per diuersas attentiones discernitur. Nullam uim tamen faciunt in rerum essentia attentiones hominum. Nullius enim attentio confert ipsis rebus uel esse quod non sunt, uel non esse quod sunt. Si quis ergo Socratem attendat tamquam Socratem, idest in omni proprietate Socratis, inueniet eum cum nullo conuenientem, potius ab omnibus differentem per socratitatem quae in illo solo reperitur et in aliis esse non potest, uel eadem uel consimilis, cum nihil sit consimile Socrati secundum statum Socratis; et sic Socrates, secundum hunc differentem statum, est indiuiduum. Vnde conuenienter datur sibi hoc uocabulum quod est 'Socrates,' quod significat eum secundum talem statum. . . . Sed si simpliciter attendatur Socrates non ut Socrates, idest non in omni proprietate Socratis, sed in quadam, scilicet in eo quod est animal rationale mortale, iam secundum hunc statum est differens et indifferens; differens a qualibet alia re existente, hoc modo quo ipse Socrates nec secundum statum hominis nec secundum aliquem alium est essentialiter aliquod aliorum. Item, indifferens est, idest consimilis cum quibusdam, scilicet cum Platone et cum aliis indiuiduis hominis, in eo quod in unoquoque eorum est animal rationale mortale." See also GS §50, quoted above, n. 31. 62 : "Statum autem hominis ipsum esse hominem, quod non est res, uocamus, quod etiam diximus communem causam impositionis nominis ad singulos, secundum quod ipsi ad inuicem conueniunt. Saepe autem causae nomine ea quoque quae res aliqua non sunt appellamus, ut cum dicitur: Verberatus est, quia non uult ad forum. Non uult ad forum, quod ut causa ponitur, nulla est essentia. Statum quoque hominis res ipsas in [in is Geyer's emendation for the MS non] natura hominis statutas possumus appellare, quarum communem similitudinem ille concepit, qui uocabulum imposuit." On the very last sentence, see page 571 below.
63
See LI 22.28-23.4. On Abelard's status, see especially Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, Jolivet, 194; Marenbon, The Philosophy, [191] [192] [193] [194] [195] [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] ; Kevin Guilfoy, Theory, 52-76; de Libera, L'Art, 373-76; Irène Rosier-Catach, "Priscian on Divine Ideas," 232-36; Mark K. Spencer, "Status"; and Marenbon, "Universals," 40-41, 44-51. i n d i v i d u a l s a s u n i v e r s a l s seem to be extramental. Scholars have wondered whether, while claiming that status are not things (and having strict requirements for what counts as a thing), Abelard is committing himself to something that would count as a thing according to contemporary use of the word.
64
We can identify two differences between Abelard and the individuum-theory in their accounts of status. (i) Abelard claims that status are not things, 65 whereas P17 calls status "either the things constituted from matter and forms, or the affections, that is, constitutions, that are in constituted things, or the parts that constitute the things themselves."
66 However, there is further evidence to suggest that the picture is more complex than this. In point of fact, 'Quoniam de generali' never claims that status are things. There is also no justification for saying (as is sometimes found in secondary literature) that, being a form of realism, the individuum-theory claims status to be things. 67 The individuum-theory grounds its realism on individual things, not on status. From its claim that universals are things, we cannot infer that status are things, because the theory does not hold universals to be status; rather, it holds universals to be the individual things. On the other hand, Abelard also tells us that one can call status "the things themselves set up [statutas] in the nature of man, the common likeness of which the person who imposed the word conceived."
68
This is a controversial statement, based on Bernhard Geyer's correction of the manuscript text, and it has prompted various interpretations. 69 Most recently, John Marenbon suggested that "the things themselves" mentioned here might be particular differences. 70 Still, Abelard seemingly accepts calling certain things status at this point. (ii) A second difference is that an Abelardian status is that in which various individuals come together; the individuum-theory, by contrast, identifies various status for each individual. There are status in which an individual is not different from other individuals, but also a status (marking that individual as individual) in which that individual is different from others. However, here, too, there are similarities. The account of the individuum-theory in LNPS, for instance, speaks of status as that "in the participation of which many things come together" or "do not come together."
71
Attentio/attendere are mentioned in the Logica 'Ingredientibus' and in De intellectibus in conjunction with intellectus ('understanding'). 72 An understanding is an act of 64 the soul that consists of considering (attendere) something, or paying attention (attentio) to something. 73 An understanding is therefore not identical to the attentio (or, as we shall see, to the several attentiones) involved in it. Understandings ought to be distinguished further from the content/object of that act, 74 as well as from sense, imagination, estimation, knowledge and reason.
75 As highlighted by Chris Martin, any understanding involves two aspects.
76 On the one hand, it needs an object extrinsic to the act. When things are perceived by the senses, the attentio is directed to the things themselves. When things are not perceived by the senses (because what I am considering is sensible but not being perceived by my senses at that time, or because what I am considering is not a sensible thing at all) the attentio is directed to mental images.
77 On the other hand, understandings have an "adverbial component"; that is to say, they consider the object in a particular way (modus). It is possible to consider the same thing in different ways through different attentiones. In each case a different understanding is produced. For instance, a piece of wood can be considered inasmuch as it is a piece of wood, inasmuch as it is a body or inasmuch as it is an oak tree or a fig tree. Different attentiones will result in different understandings ("diuersae attentiones uariant intellectus").
78
The individuum-theory only considers attentio paid to individuals in their status of being individuals, or to individuals in other status that they possess.
79 Abelard's use of attentio is much wider. We can pay attention to things that do not exist. We have, for instance, an understanding of past time, future time and of imaginary 73 LI Per. I.22 (29.104-8): "Praeterea sensus, quem Aristoteles perhibet semper cum sensato in animali consistere, quaedam uis est et potentia animae, intellectus uero actio quaedam est. Vnde intelligere dicimus, dum aliquid cogitamus"; LI Per. I. 19-20 (29.95-102) : "quippe intellectus quasi effectus rationis est. Est autem ratio potentia discernendi, id est attendendi et deliberandi apud se aliquid quasi in aliqua natura uel proprietate consistens, ueluti si quis rem aliquam uel in eo quod est res, uel in eo quod est substantia uel corporea uel sensibilis uel colorata penset, uel quasi in aliqua natura uel proprietate excogitet ipsam, etsi ipsa non sit, sicut hircoceruus uel dies crastina uel lapis risibilis"; LI Per. I.49 (37.284-86) : "Imaginari itaque est figere animum in re, intelligere uero est rem ipsam uel aliquam ipsius naturam uel proprietatem attendere"; int. §6: "At uero intellectus esse non potest, nisi ex ratione aliquid iuxta aliquam naturam aut proprietatem attendatur, etiam si sit intelligentia cassa"; cf. int. §7.
74 Understanding (intellectus) is distinguished from sense perception (sensus) in LI 20.20-36; from sense perception and imagination (imaginatio), and very briefly reason (ratio), in LI Per. I. 19-24 (28.89-30.132), 40-53 (34.227-38.312) , 61 (40.349-52); from sense perception, imagination, reason, estimation (existimatio) and knowledge (scientia) in int. § §1-28. See Gracia, Introduction, . 76 Martin, "Imposition and essence," 189-93. 77 . [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] : "Et saepe in eadem imagine diuersae attentiones uariant intellectus, ueluti si eam simpliciter ad naturam qualitatis excogitandam instituam uel ad naturam etiam albedinis. Videns enim lignum diuersa de eo per rationem attendo, quia modo ipsum in eo quod lignum est excogito, modo in eo simpliciter quod corpus, modo in eo quod quercus est uel ficus. Similiter eadem imagine ante mentis oculos constituta ipsam et qualitatis et albedinis naturam considero et licet sit eadem imago, plures sunt de ea concipiendi modi, modo in eo quod qualitas est, modo in eo quoque quod est album."
79
In Abelard's terminology, these understandings are all "sound" (sani) and "simple" (simplices)-however, when I consider 'rational mortal animal' rather than 'man,' my understanding is not simple but composite. On sound vs. empty understandings, ; int. § §56-59; on simple vs. composite understandings, LI Per. I.94 (52.621-53.643); int. § §31-45. i n d i v i d u a l s a s u n i v e r s a l s entities such as chimeras.
80 Understandings can be combined into composite understandings. In such cases, more than one attentio is involved, one for each element that has been joined and one for their joining. To give an example, the understanding of a laughing stone is a composite understanding. It involves three attentiones: one for the stone, one for the property of laughing and one for their joining.
81 As these examples show, the understanding need not be sound: it can be an empty understanding whereby properties that are not joined in reality have been joined.
82 Moreover, understandings (acts involving attentiones toward an object) can be formed as the result of hearing words. For a word or a group of words to signify means precisely to produce an understanding in the hearer's mind. Attentio toward something can be gained as the result of hearing a vox significativa, a meaningful word. But attentio can also be gained as the result of hearing a syncategorematic term with words with which it co-signifies, 83 or simply by the conjoining of voces significativae according to grammatical rules, as in 'laughing stone.' All such attentiones contribute to the composite understanding produced by hearing that string of words.
Neutralizing Opposite Predicates, or How to Predicate Opposite Predicates of One and the Same Thing
Even if one grants that identity by indifference and status/attentio could work for the individuum-theory, many problems remain. According to Porphyry and Aristotle, individuals and universals have opposing definitions. Their crucial difference is whether they are predicated of many. A universal is predicated of many; the individual is not (the individual is predicated of one only).
84
The individuum-theory, therefore, faces a double obstacle. The first obstacle is how the definition of genus or species, which is meant to differentiate a genus or a species from an individual, can be applied to an individual thing. The second obstacle is how this definition can be applied to an individual thing. Such definitions 80 See int. §5: "Intellectus uero, hoc est ipsa animi excogitatio, nec corporei exercitio indiget instrumenti quo uidelicet ad excogitandum utatur, nec etiam uirtute rei existentis quam excogitetur, cum aeque scilicet et existentem et non existentem rem, siue corporalem siue incorporalem, animus sibi per intellectum conficiat, uel preteritorum scilicet reminiscendo uel futura prouidendo, uel ea etiam nonnumquam configendo que numquam esse contingit, utpote centaurum, chimeram, hircoceruum, sirenes, et alia multa." Such examples are repeated in int. §94, quoted above, n. 73) . 81 Abelard's example is, in fact, homo rudibilis ("man who can bray"), but he also mentions lapis risibilis in LI Per. I.20 (29.102) and lapis rationalis in int. §49. In all these examples, a certain species has been joined with the differentia or proprium pertaining to another species; see LI Per. I.117 (60.827-34) : "Volumus insuper in 'homo rudibilis' quandam intellectus partem ex coniunctione constructionis nasci, qua uidelicet, cum et hominem et rudibilitatem attendimus, insuper ea in unam substantiam coniungimus, quae coniunctio cassat intellectum. Tres itaque sunt attentiones, duae ad percipienda uera quae ad actiones pertinent, tertia ad coniungenda illa duo in unum, quod adiectiui et substantiui iunctura facit. Ex iunctura itaque totius orationis una est attentio quae est tertia pars intellectus."
82 Sound and empty understandings are not the same as true and false understandings: LI Per. I.98 (54.684-87) ; int. § §56-60. On attentio with respect to truth and falsity, see LI Per. I. 107-8 (57.750-58.777) .
83 , with the example of the conjunction 'if, "Discussions, [23] [24] Cf. pages 563-64 above.
clearly stem from the predicative approach to universals. It is difficult to claim that a thing (let alone an individual thing) is predicated of many since things themselves are not predicated.
85
Realists, however, have at least one strategy for dealing with the latter obstacle. The predicate '[is] predicated of many,' they say, must undergo "ontological interpretation."
86 'Socrates (in statu x) is predicated of many' is a figurative way of speaking and merely means, they say, 'Socrates is similar to many in being a certain x,' or 'Socrates converges with many in being a certain x.'
87
The main obstacle, therefore, is the first one-applying the definition of universal (as that which is predicated of many) to an individual. Opposing properties would be predicated of that individual. Saying that Socrates is a universal means that Socrates is both predicated of many/agrees with many (as a universal) and is not predicated of many/does not agree with many (as an individual). How can opposite predicates be true of one and the same thing? Two main strategies can be envisioned for dealing with this. One is to find a way for truly predicating opposing predicates of one and the same thing. Another is to claim that what seem to be opposing predicates are not, in fact, opposing-that is, to neutralize their opposition. This latter strategy is endorsed by the individuum-theory using some Abelardian tools. And the first strategy was also tried by Abelard, as we shall see.
In brief, the strategy of the individuum-theory for dealing with opposing predicates predicated of one and the same thing is to introduce status into such predicates. 88 We have seen that, according to this theory, 'Socrates is a genus' and 'Socrates is predicated of many' are both true. However, one needs to be careful with such formulations. In order for them to be true, 'Socrates' must not refer to Socrates in statu Socratis, that is, Socrates insofar as he is an individual. If '[is] predicated of many' is predicated of Socrates truly, then we must be considering Socrates in a species-related or genus-related state, for instance, in statu animalis. Predicates, in other words, are attributed to Socrates according to a certain status he has, not others (and not any status). Thus, the proper status has to be identified in the subject when we predicate predicates such as '[is] predicated of many,' in order to determine whether the sentence is true (as in: 'Socrates according to animal-state is predicated of many') or false (as in: 'Socrates according to Socratesstate is predicated of many').
The theory, however, takes a further step. When we provide an ontological translation of certain predicates, such as '[is] predicated of many,' 89 the status according to which the subject is taken is, in fact, moved to the predicate position. This is clear if the ontological translation of these predicates is considered. 'Socrates (in statu animalis) is predicated of many' means 'many agree with Socrates in being animal'; 'Socrates (in statu Socratis) is not predicated of many' means 'many do An example would be a statue and the stone from which it is made (another example is the physical aspect of a word insofar as it is uttered, vox, and the word insofar as it signifies something, sermo).
94 A statue and the stone that makes it are, Abelard says, "the same in essence," with essentia here meaning 'thing.'
95 A statue and its stone are, in other words, one and the same thing. They are not, however, "the same in property," because they fail to be the same in all their properties. There are properties that can be truly predicated of the statue, but not of the stone, and vice versa. For instance, only the statue is made material when it is sculpted (passing from the mind of its artisan into a material state); the stone is not (being already material before the statue was sculpted).
90
QG § §42-43: "Item opponitur. Cum Socrates secundum statum animalis sit genus, praedicatur de pluribus, quod est omnis generis; et item, cum Socrates secundum statum Socratis sit indiuiduum, praedicatur de uno solo, auctoritate Porphyrii, et ita non praedicatur de multis. Quodsi Socrates praedicatur de multis et non praedicatur de multis, uerae sunt duae diuidentes. Quod est impossibile. Solutio. Cum dicimus: 'Socrates secundum statum animalis praedicatur de pluribus,' haec determinatio, scilicet 'secundum statum animalis,' refertur ad praedicatum. Et est sensus talis: Plura conueniunt in hoc quod sunt animalia. Cum uero dicimus: 'Socrates secundum statum Socratis praedicatur de uno solo,' illa determinatio 'secundum statum Socratis' refertur ad praedicatum. Et est sensus: Non est uerum quod plura conueniant in hoc quod sunt Socrates. Et ita non sunt diuidentes, et uerum est utrumque, scilicet quod plura sunt animal et quod plura non sunt Socrates." Ibi, §47: "Dicamus ergo: Porphyrius, cum dicat genera differe ab indiuiduis per praedicari de pluribus, nullam ponit proprietatem in genere quae non sit in indiuiduo ipsius generis, sed utrimque intendit dare differentiam inter genera et indiuidua, in hoc scilicet quod genera praedicantur de pluribus (idest plura conueniunt in generali statu), indiuidua non praedicantur de pluribus (idest non est uerum quod plura conueniant in indiuiduali statu Difference in definition is said to be the same as difference in property in TSch II.97 (455.1440-44) . However, the two are listed separately in TChr III. 154-58 (252.1875-254.1926 ) and what follows only concerns difference in property.
94
See especially TChr III. 140-41 (248.1707-39) . It should be noted that the statue/stone example (also framed as comparisons with a bronze statue and a waxen image) is simply an example that Abelard uses for addressing semantic, Trinitarian and ethical problems (such as the identity of vox and sermo; the identity of the Persons of the Trinity; the fact that a punishment is an evil and a good thing at the same time), rather than something in which he is directly interested as such. 95 See page 566 above.
If two items, a and b, are the same in essence but not in property, then in one sense we are authorized to say that 'a is b,' and in another sense we are not authorized to say this. It seems that we are authorized to say this because they are the same thing. However, we are not fully authorized to say this because, usually, 'a is b' means that any property that is truly predicated of b is also truly predicated of a-and, as the examples show, this is not the case here. So, should we or should we not say that a is b?
Abelard replies that when a and b are essentially the same but differ in property, we should say 'a is that which is b,' but not 'a is b. ' Abelard's solution has two aspects. First, he shows that in the proposition 'a is b' there is, in fact, a double predication: an essential predication of b with respect to a, and an adjacent predication of the properties of b with respect to a. Essential predication means that, if the proposition is true, the thing denoted by a is identical to the thing denoted by b. For instance, in the proposition 'Socrates is white,' the essential predication says that Socrates is (identical to) the white thing. Adjacent predication, on the contrary, means that the property of b inheres in a. In the proposition 'Socrates is white,' the adjacent predication says that whiteness inheres in Socrates.
96 In the case of the statue and its stone, however, only the essential predication between a and b is true, whereas the adjacent predication of the properties of b with respect to a is not. Therefore (and this is his second step), Abelard suggests using an expression such as 'a is that which is b,' which, in his eyes, indicates only the essential predication between a and b and involves no adjacent predication of b with respect to a.
97
This is a powerful way of attributing different (even opposing) properties to two items, a and b, while also saying that they are essentially the same. In other words, it could represent a different way of tackling the problem of the individuumtheory. Supporters of this view could say that 'the individual is the universal' should rightly be understood as 'the individual is that which is the universal.' Opposing properties could then be predicated of each of them: 'predicated of many' could be truly said of the universal, and 'not predicated of many' of the individual.
98 But instead of attributing opposing predicates to two items that are (only) essentially the same, the opposite strategy is deployed, that of neutralizing the predicates' See, for instance, TChr IV. 90 (308.1385-309.1394 ): "Et quemadmodum ibi quod est materia est id quod est materiatum ex ea, utpote cera ipsa est cerea imago, uel e conuerso, nec tamen ideo ipsa materia est materiata ex se, uel ipsum materiatum est materia sui, ita et hic id quod Pater est id quod est Filius et e conuerso; nec tamen Pater est Filius, uel e conuerso. Ibi quippe substantiae praedicatio fit, cum uidelicet dicitur: est id quod est materiatum, uel quod est Filius; hic uero proprietatis, cum dicitur: est materiata, uel est Filius. Substantia uero eadem est, proprietates uero impermixtae sunt." See also, Wilks, "Peter Abelard," 369-84. As shown by Wilks (ibi, 372, n. 25) , Abelard employs at least three kinds of "essential-predication locutions," that is, locutions that involve essential but not adjacent predication or, as Wilks states, locution that "relate the thing corresponding to the subject term with the thing, not the property, corresponding to the predicated term" (ibi, 378): (i) the id quod-phrase ("est id quod est bonus"), (ii) the res-phrase ("est bona res"), and (iii) the neuter inflection ("est bonum").
98 Moreover, it cannot be inferred from "the individual is that which is universal" (which is true) that "the individual is predicated of many" (which is false). i n d Applying the essential-only-predication strategy would mean that universals and individuals are two distinct entities somehow unified in one existing thing. The individuum-theory takes the opposite direction. It claims that universals and individuals are not distinct entities at all, and that the definition of a universal can truly be applied to the individual thing.
c o n c l u s i o n
In the twelfth century, a form of realism was endorsed that attempted to incorporate elements palatable to nominalists. I have called such realism the 'individuumtheory' and tried to list such elements, which included criticizing material essence realism, endorsing the idea that only individuals exist, introducing a new sort of identity, positing status and attentiones, and finding strategies for neutralizing opposing predicates. Many elements characterizing such realism are also found in Abelard to serve the very different aim of developing a non-realist account of universals. Was the individuum-theory a successful position? According to John of Salisbury, the view was quickly abandoned.
99 All in all, the position seems at best problematic, at worst paradoxical. If modern criteria of explanatory power and parsimony are used to assess it, individuum-theory does not seem to score well. Indifferentia performs the job that, in other accounts, is done by common universals: explaining similarity among things. One could argue, however, that its explanatory power is minimal and the problem is merely pushed to another level. Status raise doubts with respect to parsimony. One may wonder whether, by admitting status, one is committed to the existence of other things in addition to individual things. Abelard, for instance, argues against the individuum-theory that if individual things come together in man and each man is either this man or that man, then individual things come together in this or that individual man. But this cannot be true because any individual, qua individual, differs from other things rather than agreeing with them.
100 Such an argument challenges status by interpreting the coming together of things as a coming together in some thing.
101 It also raises an additional point of criticism. It challenges the idea that opposing predicates really apply to one and the same thing, as is required by the claim that individuals are universals. Even if some predicates can be neutralized into different status, problems remain with other properties since individuals and universals ultimately have to do entirely different jobs (explaining the fact of being distinct vs. explaining the fact of 99 See texts on n. 27. 100 One may argue that, if the relation of identity through indifference is real, then it must be grounded in some existing thing (which could either be the individual thing, or the status). This is not, however, the way in which the argument in framed in Abelard (who actually, as detailed in sect. 3.2, considers status both as that in which things agree and as a non-thing).
